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In this short essay, I draw attention to the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Pakistan, focusing specifically on the difficulties faced by them from the moment they decide to return their homes. Given the complexities of the socio-poli-
tical and economic situation in the country, some of the 
issues raised here may also be extended to other contexts. 
To focus this proposal, I shall deal with the concepts and 
definitions of the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacements (henceforth simply Principles) 
and restrict the analysis to the Swat Valley region, where 
conflicts have caused the largest displacement of persons 
in Asia in 2007 (IDMC, 2008).
On principles and concepts
First, however, let me address a few conceptual issues. 
From the readings of Frederico et al. (2007), I shall treat 
the displacement of persons simultaneously as a conse-
quence of armed conflicts (albeit not only) and as a pro-
cess, which begins at the moment people are forced to leave 
their homes. Thus, the issue of IDPs cannot be thoroughly 
understood merely in terms of artificial stages of displa-
cement, but as a whole process. Although the Principles 
(UN, 1998) adopt a sequential approach, I deem it useful 
to the objectives of this essay for the document highlights 
the problems most commonly faced by IDPs during the 
process of displacement and due to its broad acceptance by 
the international community.
Conceptually, the document considers internally dis-
placed
persons or groups of persons who have been forced 
or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of 
habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in or-
der to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations 
of generalized violence, violations of human rights or 
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not 
crossed an internationally recognized State border 
(UN, 1998).
I stress two main ideas from this concept: the involun-
tary nature of displacement and its circumscription to sta-
tes borders. Involuntary nature because these persons have 
not left their homes due to free will, but they were forced 
to do so as a consequence of natural disasters, generalised 
violence or armed conflicts – to mention but the few cau-
ses explicitly stated in the aforementioned definition.
Since they were forced to leave their homes and they 
can rarely take more than their own clothes, these persons 
inevitably need some form of protection, as they cannot 
ensure their livelihood by themselves. Such responsibili-
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ty falls upon the state in which they are, once they have 
not “crossed an internationally recognized State border” – 
which would, therefore, turn them refugees. Hence, there 
is a clear influence of the traditional concept of state sove-
reignty in this working definition, and thus IDPs become a 
legitimate concern for the international community when 
that state refuses or is unable to guarantee such protection 
(Mooney, 2005).
The internal conflicts of Pakistan
For decades, Pakistan has suffered from corruption, 
institutional inefficiency and recurrent autocratic military 
regimes. More recently, the country has experienced a re-
lative increase in internal fighting when the then President 
Pervez Musharraf ceased support for the Taliban regime, 
becoming one of the main Washington allies in the Middle 
East – albeit this is a rather dubious relationship (The 
Economist, 2008). Since then, in addition to supporting 
actions of intelligence, Islamabad has sent troops to com-
bat Talibans in the large border with Afghanistan, espe-
cially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) – wherein 
the Swat Valley is located.
In the 1990s, the inhabitants of the province witnes-
sed the emergence of the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-
Mohammadi (TNSM), an extremist Sunni group who, ins-
pired by the Taliban, has sought to impose the Sharia in the 
region. Such attempt, however, were not much successful 
due to the counterweight of slightly more secular groups 
and parties (ICG, 2005). In 2001, following the US-led in-
tervention in Afghanistan, the TNSM started recruiting 
combatants to fight alongside their allies. Although weake-
ned by several deaths and arrests, the remaining militants 
rallied as a pro-Taliban armed movement and, from July 
2007, they started combating the Pakistani government. In 
one of their first actions, the militants launched offensives 
in several cities in the Swat Valley in an attempt to create 
an Islamic state (ICG, 2006b).
In October, when TNSM has already gained control 
over about 60 towns in the region, the central government 
started responding with air bombings and military ground 
actions. These operations produced the largest displace-
ment of persons in Asia in 2007, with estimates ranging 
from 400,000 to 900,000 persons – the official figures are 
not reliable and the Pakistani government hampers the 
access of international organisations for further investiga-
tions (IDMC, 2008, HRCP, 2008).
The geographical limits with the FATA also contribute 
to the turbulence and instability of the NWFP for two rea-
sons. First, because the Talibans who seek for shelter in the 
mountains of the tribal areas eventually reach the NWFP. 
Furthermore, there is an important flow of displaced per-
sons from the FATA to the province: at least 80,000 people 
were forced to leave their homes towards the NWFP due to 
violent clashes in the tribal areas (IDMC, 2008).
The arduous return
There are several causes for displacement in Pakistan: 
earthquakes, cyclones, floods, armed conflicts and deve-
lopment projects in some areas (IDMC, 2008). Following 
the proposal stated in the first section, however, I have res-
tricted this analysis to only one of these causes – armed 
conflicts – and to a single region – the Swat Valley, in the 
NWFP. They are now analysed in the light of the last sec-
tion of the Principles, related to the return, resettlement 
and reintegration of IDPs (principles 28 to 30).
According to the Principles, the competent authorities 
are responsible for establishing the conditions and means 
for the voluntary return of IDPs or their resettlement in 
another part of the country, and for facilitating the process 
of reintegration (Principle 28.1). To achieve the objectives 
of this essay, I shall treat security as one of the conditions 
and the programmes and strategies aiming the return of 
IDPs as one of the means.
Since displaced persons have been forced or obliged to 
leave their homes “in particular as a result of or in order 
to avoid the effects” (see definition above) of widespread 
violence and armed conflicts 
(among others), the ability of the 
competent authorities to provi-
de them security becomes a cru-
cial factor for their return. The 
perception of recurrent fighting 
or the feeling of insecurity in the 
Swat Valley, which have been 
reinforced by the failure of the 
peace agreements signed between the central government 
and local forces (ICG, 2006a, 2006b), clearly discourages 
the return of displaced persons – or at least causes some 
delay. The lack of security (or the perception of insecurity) 
also affects the IDPs camps established by international or-
ganisations such as the UNHCR (IDMC, 2008, IRIN, 2008, 
HRCP, 2008).
Islamabad, however, cannot guarantee such security 
to the displaced persons due to the lack of both economic 
resources and political capability. The prospects for the 
cessation of hostilities seem even less encouraging if we 
remember that the political turmoil in the country reflects, 
partially, inter-tribal tensions and, especially in the NWFP, 
tensions between the provincial and the federal authorities 
(UNHCR, 2007).
Authorities have to provide the safety of displaced persons 
in their journey back, the basic services in their place of 
origin, and the reconstruction of local infrastructure, usually 
destroyed by the fightings. However, Islamabad does not 
promote any of these actions in the NWFP.
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The programmes and strategies directed to the displa-
ced persons are the means used to ensure their return “in 
safety and with dignity”. In this sense, authorities have to 
provide, amongst others, the safety of displaced persons 
in their journey back; the basic services in their place of 
origin, such as schools, roads, and health centres; and the 
reconstruction of local infrastructure, usually destroyed by 
the fightings. However, Islamabad does not promote any of 
these actions in the NWFP and the few ongoing initiatives 
– which are clearly inadequate – were initially proposed 
by the provincial governments (IDMC, 2008). Besides the 
differences in political interests that undermine the imple-
mentation of such actions, it is noteworthy to stress that 
the financial resources needed to establish and sustain tho-
se programs are scarce in an economy with inflation rates 
at about 30 percent – and in talks with the IMF to obtain 
emergency financial aids (The Economist, 2008b).
Attaining success in the return of those persons also re-
quires the effective participation of IDPs in the planning 
and development of the actions and programmes aiming 
their return and reintegration (Principle 28.2). Including 
IDPs is an important step for undermining possible feelin-
gs of exclusion and for giving them a sense of dignity, fre-
quently lost as a result of displacement (Frederick, 2007). 
Moreover, the interests of the IDPs can be very different, 
depending on the hardships suffered during the displa-
cement and on the reality they face after returning home 
(IRIN, 2008, HRCP, 2008). Therefore, who is in a better 
position than the IDPs themselves, the target audience of 
those actions, to assert their needs? In the Swat Valley, ho-
wever, the dialogue between local authorities and militants 
and the central government is precarious due to political 
and religious differences – even the peace agreements sig-
ned between Islamabad and the local forces have failed 
(ICG, 2006b, 2007).
Also according to the Principles, it is crucial that the re-
turnees do not suffer any discrimination after their return 
(Principle 29.1). However, the Pakistani government has 
just incipient capabilities to address such issue, especially 
if we take into account the aspects of religion, gender and 
resentment. TNSM religious fundamentalism too often le-
ads to bombings against music and video shops, Internet 
access local stations and schools for girls (IDMC, 2008). It 
is also possible that people who remained resent the return 
of those who have left their homes, a situation that can 
hamper the sharing of the already limited resources and 
may proportionate discrimination regarding the use of the 
existing infrastructure. Finally, it is necessary to consider 
the role of women in the strategies of return, since they 
often assume new social roles when other family mem-
bers die (Shoemaker, 2002) – too often, men remain in the 
Valley to guarantee their homes, but it is not infrequent 
that they become victims of the conflict before the return 
of their families (IDMC, 2008).
In regard to Principle 29.2, Islamabad is not able to 
ensure the recovery of IDPs’ property. In the Valley, after 
the first levy of displacement, many persons returned and 
found their homes destroyed as a result of the bombin-
gs carried out by the government troops (IDMC, 2008). 
The virtual collapse of Pakistan’s 
economy makes any financial 
assistance or economic compen-
sation for the returnees almost 
impossible. Moreover, with the 
weakened rule of law, Islamabad 
cannot even enforce the very 
right of property, hampering 
the conditions of those persons 
who, after returning, find their homes occupied by others 
(IDMC, 2008) – who, in turn, pledge the right not to leave, 
since they have not “abandoned” the place.
With the clear debility of the central government, other 
states or organisations sought to assume the responsibility 
to protect the displaced. Humanitarian organisations, ho-
wever, have been granted a restricted access to the Swat 
Valley, in a clear contrast to the last principle of the docu-
ment in reference. Such access is limited or even inexistent 
due to both the precarious security conditions and to the 
Taliban militants, who threaten to attack the camps of dis-
placed persons established by humanitarian organisations 
(IDMC, 2008). In the Swat Valley, whilst not completely 
impeding the access of those organisations – as in other 
regions of the country (IDMC, 2008) – the central gover-
nment has limited the freedom of press, preventing some 
facts – such as the number of displaced persons – from 
being accurately assessed and published.
Final remark
In this brief essay, I sought to point out some of the 
difficulties faced by IDPs in their return to the Swat Valley. 
The case study was chosen due to the large number of dis-
placements in 2007, but the difficulties in the region can 
be generalised to the entire country as the Pakistani state 
is unable to comply with one of its most basic functions: to 
ensure the safety of its citizens.
The analysis has found that the solution to the return 
of IDPs to the Swat Valley – just as in other regions or 
countries in similar situation – requires deep and long-
lasting measures that tackle the root-causes of the conflict. 
Accordingly, any strategy that neglects the restoration of 
the Pakistani state, including strengthening the rule of law 
The virtual collapse of Pakistan’s economy makes any 
financial assistance or economic compensation for the 
returnees almost impossible. Islamabad cannot even enforce 
property rights, hampering the conditions of those people 
who, after returning, found their homes occupied by others.
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and the economic activity, will be incomplete. Moreover, 
if displacement is to be understood as a process, it is also 
necessary to adopt simultaneously bottom-up and top-do-
wn strategies of action to the protection of IDPs, especially 
through their inclusion in the creation and development of 
such strategies and through the cooperation between the 
IDPs and civil society, provincial governments, internatio-
nal organisations and the central government.
However, if the circumscription of displaced persons 
to states border means that their protection is under the 
responsibility of the state in which they are, on the other 
hand, the absolute respect for territorial sovereignty pre-
vents greater involvement of the international community 
in situations where the state is unable to meet such respon-
sibility. It is therefore urgent to forge, within the interna-
tional community, a better understanding on the serious 
limitations and implications of the absolute respect for the 
principle of state sovereignty (which clearly is reflected in 
the Principles), some of which I have sought to point out 
in this essay.
References
Frederico, Margarita et. al. (2007) “Building community 
following displacement due to armed conflict: a case 
study” International Social Work 50(2):171-184.
HRCP: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (2008) 
HRCP Annual Report – State of the Human Rights in 
2007, http://www.hrcp-web.org/hrcpDetail_pub3.
cfm?proId=528&catid=173 [20 Feb 2009].
ICG: International Crisis Group (2005) “The state of sec-
tarianism in Pakistan” Asia Report nº95, 18 April 2005, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/
south_asia/095_the_state_of_sectarianism_in_pakistan.
pdf [21 Feb 2009].
_______ (2006a) “Pakistan:  the worsening conflict in 
Balochistan” Asia Report nº119, 14 September 2006, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/
south_asia/119_pakistan_the_worsening_conflict_in_
balochistan.pdf [22 Feb 2009].
_______ (2006b) “Pakistan’s tribal areas: appeasing the 
militants” Asia Report nº125, 11 December 2006, http://
www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_
asia/125_pakistans_tribal_areas___appeasing_the_mil-
itants.pdf [22 Feb 2009].
_______ (2007) “Pakistan: the forgotten conflict in 
Balochistan” Asia briefing nº69, 22 October 2007, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/
south_asia/b69_pakistan__the_forgotten_conflict_in_
balochistan.pdf [22 Feb 2009].
IDMC: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
(2008) Pakistan: Displacement ongoing in a number 
of regios – A profile on the internal displacement situa-
tion, 15 May 2008, http://www.internal-displacement.
org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/D927619B
0A8659BB802570A7004BDA56?opendocument&cou
nt=10000 [23 Feb 2008].
IRIN: Integrated Regional Information Networks (2008) 
“Pakistan: Latest news and features” http://www.irin-
news.org/Asia-Country.aspx?Country=PK [2 Feb 2008].
Mooney, Erin (2005) “The concept of internal displace-
ment and the case for internationally displaced persons 
as a category of concern” Refugee Survey Quarterly 
24(3):9-26.
UN: United Nations (1998) Report of the Representative 
of the Secretary-General, Mr, Francis M. Deng, sub-
mitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39, 
Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/
doc/UNDOC/GEN/G98/104/93/pdf/G9810493.
pdf?OpenElement, [21 Feb 2009].
Shoemaker, Jolynn (2002) “In War and Peace: Women 
and Conflict Prevention” Civil Wars 5(1):27-54.
The Economist (2008a) “A hydra-headed monster: Al-
Qaeda may have been cut down in Afghanistan, but it 
is growing in Pakistan’s border area”, The Economist, Jul 
17th 2008, http://www.economist.com/specialreports/
displaystory.cfm?story_id=11701231 [19 Feb 2009].
________ (2008b) “The last resort: as its friends make 
their excuses, Pakistan turns to an old bogey”, The 
Economist, Oct 23rd 2008, http://www.economist.com/
world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12480386 [21 Feb 
2009].
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (2007) “Country Operational Plan 2008: 
Pakistan”, 1 Sept 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/home/
PROTECTION/46f789732.pdf [21 Feb 2009].
